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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE—WE’VE GOT OURSELVES IN A PICKLE: THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ARKANSAS’S RECENT EXPANSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS MAY 
HAVE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES. Pickle v. State, 2015 Ark. 286, 466 
S.W.3d 410. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Pickle v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an individ-
ual engaged in hunting or fishing may not be subject to a criminal investiga-
tion by a law enforcement officer who does not possess a reasonable suspi-
cion that the person has violated the law.1 It is a well-established principle of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that a law enforcement officer cannot 
conduct a warrantless search of an individual without some reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.2 The 
significance of the holding in Pickle is that it creates a limitation on the au-
thority of Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission (AGFC) officers that 
does not apply to other state law enforcement officers.3 Formulated as an 
application of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1, which governs in-
vestigative stops by law enforcement, a new rule of Fourth Amendment law 
emerged from this case.4 
The new rule states that AGFC officers who conduct lawful searches of 
hunters for the purpose of ensuring compliance with game laws may not 
extend those searches to include an inquiry into a detained individual’s 
criminal history, unless a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity develops 
during the check for regulatory compliance.5 Whereas, when other law en-
forcement officers obtain an individual’s identity during a lawful detention, 
such as a traffic stop, that information can be used to conduct a search into 
the detainee’s criminal history.6 
As a consequence of this restriction on the authority of AGFC officers, 
an Arkansas hunter who has given her name and identification to an AGFC 
officer during a lawful search now has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in her criminal record.7 This expectation of privacy prevents an officer from 
investigating the sportsman’s criminal history to check for outstanding war-
 
 1.  See 2015 Ark. 286, at 6, 466 S.W.3d 410, 413. 
 2.  See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968). 
 3.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 4.  See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1; Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 5.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 6.  See, e.g., Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 157–58, 60 S.W.3d 464, 474–75 (2001). 
 7.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
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rants.8 The result of the Pickle holding is a new form of administrative 
search in which an AGFC officer may not run a check for outstanding war-
rants during a check for compliance with game laws.9 
This new “Pickle search” has created uncertainty in three areas of the 
law: (1) the legal authority possessed by AGFC officers to conduct suspi-
cionless administrative inspections, (2) the legal authority possessed by law 
enforcement officers when conducting investigative stops, and (3) the ex-
pectation of privacy possessed by individuals with regard to their criminal 
records. 
This note begins by reviewing the law of search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment and the Constitution of Arkansas.10 In particular, the 
background section focuses on the law regarding warrantless and suspicion-
less stops that are made by law enforcement officers to check the regulatory 
compliance of individuals who are engaged in privileged or highly regulated 
activities. 
With the legal background set forth, this note then describes the factual 
and procedural history of Pickle, followed by an examination of the opinion 
within the factual and legal framework.11 This analysis elucidates several 
inconsistencies in the Supreme Court of Arkansas’s reasoning and brings to 
light some strong implications that flow from the court’s holding. 
This note argues that in Pickle the Supreme Court of Arkansas need-
lessly condoned the authority of AGFC officers to conduct random, target-
ed, and suspicionless searches of sportsmen who are engaged in the activi-
ties of hunting or fishing.12 Such authority goes beyond the limits of Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure that have been established by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.13 
At the same time, the Supreme Court of Arkansas needlessly created 
the Pickle search, which expands the individual hunter’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy to include her criminal record. In other words, the criminal 
record of a sportsman, and possibly any citizen engaged in a closely regulat-
ed activity, cannot be searched during a seizure initiated for the purpose of 
checking regulatory compliance.14 
The Pickle search is a useful precedent that will be cited in numerous 
motions to suppress evidence. Though the court tried to distinguish the Pick-
 
 8.  See id., 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See infra Part II. 
 11.  See infra Parts III, IV. 
 12.  See infra Part IV. 
 13.  See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 654–55, 663 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558–62 (1976); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)). 
 14.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
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le search from an investigative search, it is especially likely that Pickle will 
be cited in motions to suppress evidence that has been obtained during an 
investigative stop, or during a routine traffic stop. 
As an alternative to creating a Fourth Amendment novelty, this note 
argues that the court could have used this opportunity to clarify the authority 
possessed by AGFC officers. Furthermore, this could have been done with-
out diminishing the efficacy of AGFC officers in policing game laws for the 
purpose of preserving state resources. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme 
Court of the United States specified procedures for keeping suspicionless 
seizures from violating the reasonableness requirement prescribed by the 
Fourth Amendment.15 The methods set out in Prouse,16 and previously 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas,17 can be applied to the duties of 
AGFC officers with reasonable ease. 
This note concludes by restating the ways in which the Pickle opinion 
will affect Arkansas law outside of the AGFC and sportsman context, and 
how the court could have avoided this outcome.18 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides a right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.19 A search violates the Fourth Amendment when it 
violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”20 One’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy has its source outside the Fourth Amendment, and 
conforms to such boundaries as are “recognized and permitted by society.”21 
A seizure occurs when a reasonable person under the circumstances is de-
tained and believes that she is not free to leave.22 
 
 15.  See Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 
323 (1978)). 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757. 
 18.  See infra Parts IV, V. 
 19.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 21.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)); Walley 
v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 605, 112 S.W.3d 349, 360 (2003) (quoting Rainey v. Hartness, 339 
Ark. 293, 301, 5 S.W.3d 410, 416 (1999) (citing United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1123 
(8th Cir. 1997))). 
 22.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983) (quoting United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)); Thompson v. State, 303 Ark. 407, 
409, 797 S.W.2d 450, 451–52 (1990). 
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Article 2, section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution provides the same 
protection as the Fourth Amendment.23 However, there is no constitutional 
objection to a rule of law that extends individual liberty beyond the mini-
mum required by the Fourth Amendment.24 
B. Warrantless Search and Seizure 
Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant be issued up-
on probable cause to authorize a search or seizure of citizens or their proper-
ty.25 The warrant requirement is in place to ensure that intrusions upon indi-
viduals are reasonable.26 In order to be reasonable, a warrantless search must 
fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.27 
1. Administrative or Regulatory Search Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s  Warrant Requirement 
The difficulty of enforcing broad regulatory regimes has been recog-
nized by both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas.28 Because regulatory enforcement serves a vital purpose 
for society at large, and for the interests of each state, the Fourth Amend-
 
 23.  ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15; Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 592, 972 S.W.2d 222, 224 
(1998) (citing Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552, 557–58, 898 S.W.2d 457, 460 (1995)). 
 24.  Meadows v. State, 269 Ark. 380, 382, 602 S.W.2d 636, 638 (1980). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 26.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Vernonia School Dist. v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). 
 27.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856–57 
(2011)); McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216, 223, 119 S.W.3d 41, 45–46 (2003) (citing Flippo 
v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999); Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 972 S.W.2d 222 (1998)). 
There are at least eight exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme 
Court of the United States and by Arkansas law: (1) Consent searches, ARK. R. CRIM. P. 11.1; 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v. United States, 328 
U.S. 582, 593–94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)); (2) Investigative 
stops, ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); (3) Automobile exception, 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 14.1; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982); (4) Search incident 
to arrest, ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.1; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); (5) 
Inventory searches, ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.6; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 
(1976); (6) Exigent circumstances, ARK. R. CRIM. P. 14.3; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770 (1966); (7) Plain view doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 
(1971); McDonald, 354 Ark. at 223, 119 S.W.3d at 46 (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Fultz, 333 Ark. 586, 972 S.W.2d 222); (8) Administrative 
searches, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981) (citing United States v. Biswell, 
406 U.S. 311 (1972)); Dominguez v. State, 290 Ark. 428, 435, 720 S.W.2d 703, 707 (1986). 
This list is not exhaustive. 
 28.  Camara v. San Francisco Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967); Hosto v. 
Brickell, 265 Ark. 147, 153, 577 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1979). 
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ment’s reasonableness requirement has been adapted to include a balancing 
test for certain highly regulated activities or industries.29 This balancing test 
can be used to relax the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements of ob-
taining a warrant, possessing probable cause, or developing reasonable sus-
picion prior to detention or search.30 
The test determines the permissibility of a particular law enforcement 
practice by weighing its intrusion on individual liberty against its promotion 
of legitimate government interests.31 To retain reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment, it is usually required that the facts of the intrusion be 
measurable against some form of objective standard.32 If implementation of 
the balancing test removes the need for any individualized suspicion before 
allowing a seizure or search, then other methods must be in place to assure 
that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not “subject to the 
discretion of an official in the field.”33 
Under certain circumstances, consent to regulatory inspection accom-
panies participation in a particular activity.34 This consent by participation 
can prevent an individual from refusing to allow a surprise inspection.35 
However, such extreme relaxation of Fourth Amendment protection seems 
to be specific to the commercial context.36 This is due to the fact that privacy 
intrusions upon individuals weigh more heavily in the balancing test than 
intrusions upon commercial entities.37 
If it is not determined that consent to a search accompanies participa-
tion in a particular activity, then regulatory inspections that are not premised 
on any individualized, articulable suspicion must be undertaken according to 
previously specified neutral criteria.38 Requiring a plan that places neutral 
limitations on the activity of individual officers prevents arbitrary invasions 
 
 29.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Dominguez, 290 Ark. at 435–36, 
720 S.W.2d at 707. 
 30.  Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654–55. 
 31.  Id. at 654. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 654–55 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 
(1972)). 
 34.  Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Col-
onnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)) (noting federal regulation of 
firearms and liquor as examples). 
 35.  Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 76–77. 
 36.  See Katrina Fischer Kuh, Environmental Privacy, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1, 37 (2015). 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (quoting Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323). 
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of individual liberty by the unfettered discretion of officers in the field,39 
thereby ensuring an individual’s expectation of privacy.40 
2. Investigative Stop Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant 
Requirement 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court of the United States held that an 
officer who does not have a warrant or probable cause can detain an indi-
vidual for investigative purposes.41 The officer’s investigative purposes must 
be founded on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual is in-
volved in criminal activity.42 The authority of law enforcement officers to 
conduct investigative stops in Arkansas is codified as Arkansas Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.1.43 
The reasonable suspicion required to make an investigative stop must 
be more than a bare suspicion, and not purely conjectural.44 The substance of 
 
 39.  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654–55, 663; 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558–62 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)). 
 40.  Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654–55, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. at 882). 
 41.  392 U.S. 1, 22, 30 (1968). 
 42.  Id. at 21. 
 43.  See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1. 
 44.  ARK. R. CRIM. P. 2.1. The Comment to Rule 2.1 contains fourteen factors to be 
considered when determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion that is sufficient to 
detain a person pursuant to Rule 3.1. Muhammad v. State, 337 Ark. 291, 298, 988 S.W.2d 17, 
21 (1999). These factors have been codified. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203 (West 2015). 
The following list of factors is illustrative and not exhaustive. See id. 
(1) The demeanor of the suspect; 
(2) The gait and manner of the suspect; 
(3) Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect’s background or charac-
ter; 
(4) Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he is carrying; 
(5) The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including bulges in clothing, 
when considered in light of all of the other factors; 
(6) The time of the day or night the suspect is observed; 
(7) Any overheard conversation of the suspect; 
(8) The particular streets and areas involved; 
(9) Any information received from third persons, whether they are known or un-
known; 
(10) Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose conduct is “reasonably 
suspect”; 
(11) The suspect’s proximity to known criminal conduct; 
(12) Incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood; 
(13) The suspect’s apparent effort to conceal an article; 
(14) Apparent effort of the suspect to avoid identification or confrontation by the 
police. 
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the suspicion must be that an individual is committing, has committed, or is 
about to commit a felony, or a misdemeanor involving danger to persons or 
property.45 The presence of reasonable suspicion depends upon whether, in 
considering the totality of the circumstances, an officer has specific, particu-
larized, and articulable reasons indicating that a person may be involved in 
criminal activity.46 
Furthermore, the actions of an officer in an investigative stop must be 
reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the identification of a person, or to 
determine the lawfulness of her conduct.47 Detention during an investigative 
stop is limited to fifteen minutes, or such time that is reasonable under the 
circumstances, after which an officer must release the detainee or arrest the 
individual and charge her with an offense.48 
3. Warrants Checks and Searches into Criminal History 
In order to ensure the safety of law enforcement during an investigative 
stop, an officer may frisk a detainee’s clothing for weapons and search the 
surrounding area.49 It is likewise clear that a search into an individual’s 
criminal history to determine if any outstanding warrants exist for the de-
tainee is an accepted part of routine investigative procedure during a traffic 
stop.50 Such investigative measures are part of a reasonable investigative 
detention within the lawful detention for a traffic violation.51 
On the other hand, under Arkansas law, it appears to be an open ques-
tion whether an officer may use a pedestrian’s identity to check for out-
standing warrants as part of the procedure inherent in an investigative stop.52 
 
 45.  ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1. 
 46.  Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37, at 6, 386 S.W.3d 451, 455 (quoting Malone v. State, 
364 Ark. 256, 263, 217 S.W.3d 810, 814 (2005) (citing Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 155, 60 
S.W.3d 464, 473 (2001))). 
 47.  ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  ARK. R. CRIM. P. 4.1; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); Davis v. 
State, 351 Ark. 406, 423, 94 S.W.3d 892, 901–02 (2003) (citing State v. Barter, 310 Ark. 94, 
833 S.W.2d 372 (1992); Stout v. State, 304 Ark. 610, 804 S.W.2d 686 (1991)). 
 50.  See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (noting that an officer 
may check for outstanding warrants during a traffic stop); United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 
542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the propriety of a warrants check as part of an in-
vestigatory traffic stop); Lilley v. State, 89 Ark. App. 43, 50, 199 S.W.3d 692, 696 (2004) 
(approving additional steps such as checking criminal history during a traffic stop). 
 51.  Lilley, 89 Ark. App. at 50, 199 S.W.3d at 696. 
 52.  There is some authority supporting the performance of a warrants check during an 
investigative stop of a pedestrian in Arkansas. See Jackson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 359, at 
23, 374 S.W.3d 857, 871 (acknowledging the trial court’s finding that an investigative search 
conducted after a warrants check proved there were no outstanding warrants for the detainee 
was a reasonable extension of detention). Although, it is clear that an officer may not “stop a 
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In other jurisdictions, performing a warrants check on a pedestrian as part of 
an investigative stop has been upheld by numerous state and federal courts.53 
Similarly, regulatory compliance checks imposed on individuals allow 
officers to verify the identity of any persons detained.54 In the context of 
motorist checkpoints, the identification of a driver can be used to run a 
check for any outstanding warrants.55 It should be noted that in this context, 
there is no need for an officer to possess suspicion toward an individual, it is 
merely by engaging in the regulated activity that one is lawfully subject to a 
brief detention and search.56 The need for reasonable suspicion that general-
ly prevents intrusion into an individual’s privacy is outweighed by the inter-
ests of the state in implementing a program of regulatory enforcement.57 
C. The Authority of AGFC Officers 
The conservation and regulation of Arkansas’s game and wildlife re-
sources, and the administration of laws pursuant thereto, are vested in the 
AGFC.58 All personnel of the AGFC have the authority to make arrests for 
violation of the game and fish laws.59 
 
citizen at any time, without reasonable grounds for suspicion, request identification, and 
arrest and search the citizen if his identity uncovers an outstanding felony warrant.” Meadows 
v. State, 269 Ark. 380, 383, 602 S.W.2d 636, 638 (1980). And there may be limits on the 
legality of performing a warrants check without detention. See Stephens v. State, 342 Ark. 
151, 155, 28 S.W.3d 260, 262 (2000) (declining to respond to Appellant’s argument that 
information of an outstanding warrant obtained from the Arkansas Crime Information Com-
puter prior to detention, and only made available by asking a store clerk the Appellant’s 
name, was illegally obtained). 
 53.  See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.2(f) n.208 (5th ed. 2014). This treatise relies on the holdings of many cases 
including: United States v. Burleson, 657 F.3d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he same 
rationale that underlies our conclusion as to the permissibility of warrants checks in the mo-
torist context applies with equal force in the pedestrian context.”); Foley v. Kiely, 602 F.3d 
28, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (a suspected trespasser’s inability or unwillingness to provide his So-
cial Security number combined with an attempt to avoid contact with police, served as a basis 
for the police to conduct a warrants check through the National Crime Information Center); 
United States v. Hutchinson, 408 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[I]t was reasonable for the 
police to retain Hutchinson’s identification on site in order to attempt a ‘WALES’ check and 
thereby prolong the Terry stop for an additional two to five minutes.”); State v. Walker, 251 
P.3d 618, 628 (Kan. 2011) (approving the use of a pedestrian’s identification to run a com-
puter records check); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 224 (Wyo. 1994) (NCIC check of a 
pedestrian requires reasonable suspicion). See LAFAVE, supra. 
 54.  See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); Mullinax v. 
State, 327 Ark. 41, 50, 938 S.W.2d 801, 806 (1997). 
 55.  See Mullinax, 327 Ark. at 50, 938 S.W.2d at 806. 
 56.  See id. at 47, 938 S.W.2d at 804. 
 57.  See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
 58.  ARK. CONST. amend. XXXV, § 1. 
 59.  ARK. CONST. amend. XXXV, § 8. 
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The Arkansas Legislature has declared all game and fish in Arkansas to 
be the property of the state.60 The Legislature also declared that the hunting, 
killing, and catching of Arkansas’s game and fish are privileges.61 Any of-
ficer with authority to enforce game laws may search any person, railroad 
train, boat, place of business, or any other public carrier to ascertain whether 
the game and fish laws are being violated.62 
In the performance of their duties, AGFC officers may stop and detain 
any person who they reasonably suspect is, or recently has been, involved in 
any hunting or fishing to conduct an administrative inspection for the pur-
pose of determining whether the person is in compliance with game laws.63 
For the purpose of distinguishing those who may be subject to regulatory 
enforcement of game laws from the rest of the population, the possession of 
firearms while in any location known to be game cover shall be considered 
prima facie evidence that the possessor is hunting.64 Additionally, posses-
sion of instruments usually used for fishing while in the vicinity of lakes and 
streams shall be considered prima facie evidence that the possessor is fish-
ing.65 
It is a misdemeanor to flee from an AGFC officer to avoid imminent 
inspection, detention, or arrest.66 Fleeing from an AGFC officer can be pun-
ishable by a fine up to $2,500 and a jail sentence up to sixty days.67 The 
AGFC has made it a misdemeanor to hunt or fish without possessing on 
one’s person a required license.68 Hunting or fishing without having on 
one’s person the required license can be punishable by a fine up to $1,000 
and a jail sentence up to thirty days.69 Furthermore, hunting or fishing with-
out first having obtained a hunting or fishing license is a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a fine up to $200.70 
For the purposes of making arrests, full-time AGFC officers are certi-
fied law enforcement officers with authority that is tantamount to other law 
enforcement officers.71 It has been noted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
 
 60.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-43-104 (Repl. 2009). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. § 15-41-203 (Repl. 2009). 
 63.  ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH COMMISSION CODE BOOK, § 01.00-B (2015). 
 64.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-43-105 (Repl. 2009). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH COMMISSION CODE BOOK, § 05.31 (2015). 
 67.  Id. § 01.00-I (2015). 
 68.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-107(a)(3) (Repl. 2013); ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH 
COMMISSION CODE BOOK, § 03.01 (2015). 
 69.  ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH COMMISSION CODE BOOK, § 01.00-I (2015). 
 70.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-42-101 (Repl. 2009). 
 71.  Id. § 16-81-106 (Supp. 2015). 
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that the rules governing an officer’s authority to conduct investigative stops 
apply to AGFC officers as well.72 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 18, 2012, Jimmy Paul Pickle (“Pickle”) and two other 
duck hunters prepared to eat breakfast after a morning of shooting waterfowl 
over an oxbow lake along the Cache River in Craighead County.73 Pickle’s 
hunting party did not know that for the past two hours they had been ob-
served by two AGFC law enforcement officers.74 Both officers testified that 
during those two hours, they had not observed any violations of hunting 
laws, nor did they observe any indications that a game law might have been 
violated.75 
Nonetheless, the officers made contact with Pickle’s party in order to 
perform a routine check for compliance with hunting laws.76 The officers 
asked the hunters to present their licenses, then inspected their guns, and 
searched their game bags.77 One of the officers issued a citation to one of 
Pickle’s hunting party for a firearm violation, but no other citations were 
issued at that time.78 It did come to light, however, that Pickle did not have a 
valid hunting license on his person, although he said he had left it in his 
truck.79 
The officers then moved a short distance from the hunting party, to a 
point where they could not be observed, and called to Little Rock dispatch 
asking for a “10-26” hunting and fishing license check and a “10-51” check 
through the National Crime Information Center to see if Pickle had any out-
standing warrants.80 These checks revealed that Pickle had a valid hunting 
license, and that he was a convicted felon.81 
The officers arrested Pickle for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 
and during a search incident to the arrest, the officers found a quantity of 
methamphetamine and a glass pipe.82 Pickle filed a motion in the Craighead 
County Circuit Court to have this evidence suppressed, and it was denied.83 
 
 72.  State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757. 
 73.  Pickle v. State, 2015 Ark. 286, at 2, 466 S.W.3d 410, 411; Pickle v. State, 2014 
Ark. App. 726, at 2, 453 S.W.3d 157, 160, vacated, 2015 Ark. 286. 
 74.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 2, 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 75.  Pickle, 2014 Ark. App. 276, at 2, 453 S.W.3d at 160. 
 76.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 2–3, 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 77.  Id., 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 78.  Id. at 3, 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 79.  Id., 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 80.  Id., 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 81.  Id., 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 82.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 3, 466 S.W.3d at 411–12. 
 83.  Id., 466 S.W.3d at 412. 
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Pickle appealed, arguing that the AGFC officers unlawfully detained and 
searched him in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and 
article 2, section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution.84 
The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision.85 
In doing so, the court of appeals held that AGFC officers must have reason-
able suspicion in order to legally conduct routine checks for compliance 
with hunting laws.86 The court further held that in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion, a stop or search by law enforcement must be conducted under a 
plan of explicit, neutral limitations that prevent officers from exercising 
unbridled discretion.87 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the State’s petition for review, 
and treated the appeal as if it had originally been filed in the state supreme 
court.88 In reversing the circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas vacated the court of appeals’ opinion.89 
IV. THE PICKLE HOLDING AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
A. The Court’s Holding 
In Pickle, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the investigation in-
to Pickle’s criminal past and the subsequent search of his person went far 
beyond the scope of any administrative search conducted for the purpose of 
investigating Pickle’s compliance with hunting laws.90 It is true that search-
ing Pickle’s person went far beyond the scope of an administrative search, 
but that search was incident to his arrest for being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.91 Such a search would be governed by Arkansas Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12.1, which permits an officer who is making a lawful arrest of an 
individual to conduct a warrantless search of that individual.92 But the idea 
that searching into Pickle’s criminal history went far beyond the scope of an 
administrative search that was administered to ensure compliance with the 
 
 84.  Id. at 4, 466 S.W.3d at 412. 
 85.  Pickle v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 726, at 12, 453 S.W.3d 157, 165, vacated, 2015 
Ark. 286. 
 86.  Id. at 9, 453 S.W.3d at 163. 
 87.  Id., 453 S.W.3d at 163–64 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); 
State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757). 
 88.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 1, 466 S.W.3d at 411 (citing Fowler v. State, 2010 Ark. 
431, 1, 371 S.W.3d 677, 679). 
 89.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 7, 466 S.W.3d at 414. 
 90.  Id. at 6, 466 S.W.3d at 413 (citing State v. Baldwin, 475 A.2d 522 (N.H. 1984)). 
 91.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 3, 466 S.W.3d at 411–12. 
 92.  See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.1. 
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laws governing a highly regulated activity is something new and unprece-
dented.93 
The effect of this holding is a new rule of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. The new rule limits the administrative search exception to the Fourth 
Amendment in the context of AGFC officers inspecting sportsmen.94 Now, 
when an AGFC officer inspects a hunter and her paraphernalia for compli-
ance with hunting regulations, the officer cannot legally obtain the hunter’s 
identity and then use it to look into the hunter’s criminal history.95 The Pick-
le search is a new extension of liberty under the Fourth Amendment, an ad-
ministrative search under which a person’s identity cannot be used to check 
criminal history.96 
B. The Impact of the Pickle Holding 
Three difficulties arise from the Pickle holding. First, in not deciding 
whether the AGFC officers who arrested Pickle were acting under the re-
straint of neutral limitations, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has tacitly en-
dorsed the type of targeted, suspicionless stalking and detention of hunters 
that seems so objectionable in this case.97 Second, it now appears that an 
officer of the law can obtain a person’s identity during any type of lawful 
investigative stop and use it to search the detainee’s criminal history.98 This 
is difficult to comprehend because the court also created the impression that 
during a routine traffic stop, the administrative procedure of checking for 
outstanding warrants may exceed the scope of authority that an officer has 
pursuant to issuing a citation for the traffic stop.99 And third, according to 
the court’s own reasoning, the AGFC officers possessed the requisite rea-
sonable suspicion to conduct a Rule 3.1 detention and search when they 
checked Pickle’s criminal history and discovered that he was a convicted 
felon.100 
 
 93.  See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 95.  Id., 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 96.  In other contexts, checking an individual’s criminal history is not considered an 
intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment liberty. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (noting that an officer may check for outstanding warrants during a 
traffic stop); United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the 
propriety of a warrants check as part of an investigatory stop); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judi-
cial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (approving the need to obtain a detainee’s name in 
the course of a Terry stop). 
 97.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 5, 466 S.W.3d at 412–13. 
 98.  See id. at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–414. 
 99.  See id., 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
 100.  See id., 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
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1. The Effect of Avoiding the Fourth Amendment and Some Prefera-
ble Alternatives 
Because it is illegal to flee from an AGFC officer who is attempting to 
perform an administrative inspection, Pickle was subject to a seizure that 
triggered all the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.101 It is also 
established that the officers who arrested Pickle did not possess any reason-
able suspicion that Pickle or his party had violated any hunting laws.102 
The requirement of the Fourth Amendment, that searches of individuals 
by law enforcement must be reasonable, creates a balancing test that is used 
by courts to judge the permissibility of a particular law enforcement prac-
tice.103 The balancing test weighs the intrusion on the individual’s expecta-
tion of privacy against the promotion of legitimate government interests.104 
But in those situations where the balancing test allows for a government 
official to act against the individual’s privacy without the requirement that 
the official possess any quantum of individualized suspicion regarding the 
individual, then the official must be acting in accordance with a “plan em-
bodying explicit, neutral limitations.”105 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas said: 
Even assuming, but not deciding, that it was appropriate for the officers 
to conduct a search absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the evi-
dence used to charge Pickle of possession of a firearm, possession of a 
controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, was adduced 
by the officers after they had completed any inquiry into Pickle’s com-




By assuming the appropriateness of the officers’ conduct under the 
Fourth Amendment without endorsing it, the court creates some confusion 
in this opinion. If the officers’ search of Pickle was not appropriate, then the 
evidence obtained should be suppressed and the analysis stops there. The 
evidence was suppressed in this case, but not because the officers’ suspi-
cionless and targeted search of Pickle violated the Fourth Amendment.107 
Assuming the officers’ administrative search of Pickle was appropriate, and 
continuing the analysis to include Rule 3.1, leads to the inference that the 
 
 101.  See supra notes 22, 66 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 2, 466 S.W.3d at 411. 
 103.  Id. at 4, 466 S.W.3d at 412 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 104.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 4, 466 S.W.3d at 412 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654). 
 105.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 5, 466 S.W.3d at 413 (citing State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, 
at 5, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757). 
 106.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6, 466 S.W.3d at 413. 
 107.  See id. at 7, 466 S.W.3d at 414. 
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administrative search was initially appropriate. Otherwise, there is no reason 
to extend the analysis beyond the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 
The court explained its reason for sidestepping the Fourth Amendment 
issue by saying that the record in the trial court was not developed in regard 
to whether the officers who arrested Pickle were acting under a plan embod-
ying explicit neutral limitations.108 After this opinion, it appears that AGFC 
officers have the ability to randomly target hunters and subject them to ad-
ministrative inspections for the purpose of ensuring compliance with game 
laws. However, this appearance is derived from the court’s avoidance of the 
issue. This creates uncertainty about the authority an AGFC officer possess-
es in the field. 
It seems that the court wanted to suppress the evidence against Pickle 
without deciding whether the officers were acting concordantly with the 
Fourth Amendment. There are several ways that the court could have 
reached this result without resorting to the creation of the Pickle search. 
a. The dissent’s alternative to avoiding the Fourth Amendment 
One way to avoid this outcome is developed by the dissenting opinion 
in Pickle.109 The dissent cites a concurring opinion from Delaware v. Prouse 
in which Justice Blackmun suggested that the use of neutral limitations in 
the context of game wardens may be too restrictive to the duties that game 
wardens must perform.110 Justice Blackmun went on to state that he believed 
the Court would apply the balancing test differently in this context so as to 
not deprive game wardens of the authority needed to perform their duties.111 
The dissent argues that Arkansas’s interests in regulating its wildlife 
resources are so profound that a straight application of the Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test weighs in favor of allowing AGFC officers to randomly 
target hunters for compliance checks without possessing any reasonable 
suspicion that the law has been violated.112 In making this argument, the 
dissent followed the reasoning from Elzey v. State.113 
In Elzey, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that wildlife officers may 
approach hunters, without any suspicion that the hunters have violated the 
law, in order to check for compliance with hunting regulations and to ques-
tion hunters about their hunt.114 The Georgia court found it reasonable under 
 
 108.  Id. at 5, 466 S.W.3d at 412–13 (citing Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 
757). 
 109.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 1, 466 S.W.3d at 416 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
 110.  440 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 4, 466 S.W.3d at 417 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
 113.  519 S.E.2d 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 114.  Id. at 755. 
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the Fourth Amendment for officers to detain hunters, absent any reasonable 
suspicion, because hunters, their gear, and their take from the hunt are sub-
ject to a diminished expectation of privacy.115 This reduction in a hunter’s 
expectation of privacy is caused by the fact that hunting is a highly regulated 
activity, and voluntarily engaging in the privileged activity of hunting is 
regarded as an act of consent regarding the measures that are necessary to 
preserve and protect a state’s property for the public good.116 
Even if granted validity as an exception to the Fourth Amendment, the 
idea that participation in a particular activity contains an implication of con-
sent to suspicionless searches for the purpose of checking compliance with 
the specialized regulations unique to that activity should be reserved for 
intrusions upon commercial entities.117 Intrusions upon an individual’s ex-
pectation of privacy should be subject to greater restrictions under the 
Fourth Amendment than the administrative inspection of commercial enti-
ties.118 
Allowing AGFC officers to stalk a duck hunter for two hours without 
observing any violations of the law and then to detain him for the purposes 
of a search is the very type of arbitrary, unfettered discretion of the officer in 
the field that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard was estab-
lished to prevent.119 While the Supreme Court of Arkansas avoided analyz-
ing whether the officers’ seizure of Pickle was valid under the Fourth 
Amendment, the glaring inference from the court’s decision is that AGFC 
officers do have the authority to randomly conduct suspicionless inspections 
of hunters in the field so long as they do not exceed the scope of checking 
compliance with game laws.120 If reasonable suspicion develops during the 
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 120.  See Pickle v. State, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6, 466 S.W.3d 410, 413. 
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regulatory inspection, only then would an AGFC officer have the authority 
to conduct a criminal history check.121 
The effect of the majority’s position in this case has the same effect as 
if it had adopted the dissent’s position. The only difference is that if the 
court had followed the dissent’s position the court would have clarified the 
law instead of creating uncertainty regarding the authority of AGFC offic-
ers. However, both approaches allow for random, suspicionless, targeted 
seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.122 
b. AGFC procedures can be brought within the requirements of 
Prouse and Allen without resorting to a doctrine of implied 
consent 
It is not necessary to suggest that the balancing test, which is used to 
determine the reasonableness of a government practice under the Fourth 
Amendment, is so different in the context of AGFC officers checking for 
compliance with game laws that the requirements set out in Delaware v. 
Prouse and State v. Allen must be abandoned.123 
In Prouse, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment for police officers to make random, 
suspicionless automobile stops for the purpose of checking a driver’s license 
and vehicle registration.124 The Court went on to say that under circumstanc-
es where regulatory inspections are not premised on any articulable suspi-
cion, the inspections must be undertaken pursuant to a plan of previously 
specified neutral criteria.125 This rule was further developed in Brown v. 
Texas in which the Court said “the Fourth Amendment requires that a sei-
zure [of an individual] must be based on specific, objective facts . . ., or that 
the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neu-
tral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”126 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted this rule in Allen.127 Allen in-
volved an AGFC officer’s unreasonable seizure of an individual for the pur-
pose of checking compliance with boating safety laws.128 The court found 
that there was no plan in place by which the officer determined which boats 
 
 121.  See id. at 7, 466 S.W.3d at 414. 
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to pull over for safety checks, and that the officer was not acting upon any 
suspicion of wrongdoing when he made the stop.129 The court held that 
simply relying on the officer’s arbitrary discretion about what boats to check 
was an unreasonable basis upon which to perform a seizure, and that without 
a plan in place to remove discretion from the officer in the field such a sei-
zure violates the Fourth Amendment.130 It follows that if an AGFC officer is 
to lawfully stop and inspect a hunter in the field, the officer must either pos-
sess suspicion that the hunter is violating the law, or the officer must be act-
ing pursuant to a previously specified plan of neutral limitations that re-
moves discretionary authority from the officer about whom to check for 
compliance.131 
i. Checkpoints as a neutral limitation 
One example of a plan embodying neutral limitations is a stationary 
sobriety checkpoint on a roadway that removes every fifth car from a line of 
traffic to check the driver’s licensure and see if there are any outstanding 
warrants for the individual.132 In other jurisdictions, checkpoints for enforc-
ing game laws have been upheld as reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.133 It has been argued that due to the limited manpower available and 
the vast expanses that must be patrolled, checkpoints are insufficient for 
properly protecting a state’s interests in enforcing hunting and fishing 
laws.134 However, this is not an argument against the constitutionality of 
suspicionless stops at checkpoints. So long as the location of a checkpoint is 
administratively predetermined prior to its implementation by the officers in 
the field, suspicionless stops at checkpoints would be well within the rule 
established in Prouse and adopted in Allen.135 
ii. Area enforcement as a neutral limitation 
Another possible plan of neutral limitation would be area-specific en-
forcement that requires AGFC officers to stop and check every hunter they 
come into contact with during their patrol of certain sections of land or wil-
 
 129.  Id. at 3, 5, 425 S.W.3d at 756, 757. 
 130.  Id. at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
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other grounds by State v. Jackson, 764 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000). 
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derness.136 So long as AGFC officers are not left to arbitrarily decide where 
they will patrol, then a plan embodying specific, neutral limitations can very 
easily be implemented, and may not be substantially different from the pro-
cedures currently in place in the AGFC.   
Assuming AGFC officers are currently assigned to patrol certain areas 
by a higher official in the commission, the only change that would have to 
be made in operating procedure is the implementation of a requirement that 
AGFC officers inspect every hunter they encounter during their enforcement 
tours. Though this may be a relatively localized plan, a statewide written 
plan is not required for the plan to allow for reasonable stops under the 
Fourth Amendment.137 
It is possible to argue that because there are more hunters than AGFC 
officers, some hunters who are observed by AGFC officers will inevitably 
be allowed to go unchecked. While it is true that AGFC officers may not be 
able to inspect every hunter they observe, it does not follow that the officers 
will be authorized to use arbitrary and unfettered discretion to stop whichev-
er hunters they choose.138 The officers will be bound by higher authority 
within the AGFC to consecutively stop each hunter they encounter during 
their tour of enforcement, and if some hunters are thereby exempt from in-
spection on a particular day this does not defeat the neutralizing limitation 
of the procedure. 
2. Officers Now Have the Authority to Conduct Criminal History 
Checks as Part of a Rule 3.1 Investigative Stop 
When an AGFC officer checks an individual for compliance with game 
laws, it is a lawful administrative search.139 Any detention for purposes be-
yond checking for compliance with game laws would be investigative and 
only lawful if supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity.140 Running a check on Pickle’s criminal history is the procedure 
that the court said exceeded the scope of an administrative search into com-
pliance with game laws.141 The court held that, in this case, there was no 
reasonable suspicion to support the officers’ investigation into Pickle’s 
criminal history pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1.142 
 
 136.  See McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1266. 
 137.  Mullinax, 327 Ark. at 49, 938 S.W.2d at 806. 
 138.  See McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1266. 
 139.  See Pickle v. State, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6, 466 S.W.3d 410, 413; ARKANSAS STATE 
GAME AND FISH COMMISSION CODE BOOK, § 01.00-B (2015). 
 140.  See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1; Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6, 466 S.W.3d at 413. 
 141.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6, 466 S.W.3d at 413. 
 142.  Id. at 7, 466 S.W.3d at 414. 
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This holding makes it seem well-settled that a check into an individu-
al’s criminal history to see if she has any outstanding warrants is permissible 
under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1, so long as the criterion of 
reasonable suspicion is met.143 Before Pickle, there was uncertainty in the 
law as to whether a warrants check would constitute a lawful search during 
an investigative stop.144 It is now clearly lawful for police officers to detain 
innocent individuals, so long as there is a reasonable suspicion, and demand 
information from the detainees in order to conduct a criminal history 
check.145 In the context of pedestrians who are subject to Rule 3.1 stops, this 
conclusion is supported by numerous decisions in state and federal courts.146 
3. Creating the Pickle Search on These Facts Leads to Confusion 
and Uncertainty 
Assuming that the officers had the authority to stop Pickle and check 
for regulatory compliance without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
wrongdoing, then it is possible to apply the Rule 3.1 analysis to any deten-
tion or search subsequent to the compliance check. And this is what the 
court did. However, using the facts of this case to create the Pickle search 
leads to a contradiction. 
At the moment it was discovered that Pickle did not have a hunting li-
cense on his person, the officers possessed a reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion that Pickle was hunting without having first obtained the proper licen-
sure to do so, which is a misdemeanor that endangers the state’s property in 
the form of waterfowl.147 Suspicion of this misdemeanor falls within the 
Rule 3.1 criteria.148 
According to the court’s own reasoning, at the moment the officers dis-
covered that Pickle was hunting without a license on his person, the scope of 
their search would have expanded beyond the limited administrative Pickle 
search to include lawful searches pursuant to Rule 3.1.149 It would then have 
been lawful for the officers to use Pickle’s identification to conduct a crimi-
nal history check as part of a valid Rule 3.1 investigation.150 In this case, it 
became lawful to conduct a Rule 3.1 search into Pickle’s criminal history 
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from the moment the officers discovered that he was hunting without a li-
cense on his person.151 
a. There is now uncertainty regarding the authority of police of-
ficers to run criminal history checks during routine traffic 
stops 
The Pickle holding clarified the law regarding a police officer’s author-
ity to use an individual’s identity to run a criminal history check during an 
investigative stop.152 Curiously, at the same time, the holding brings into 
question the accepted practice of checking a driver’s record for outstanding 
warrants during a vehicle stop for a traffic violation.153 
Prior to Pickle, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held on multiple occa-
sions that a driver’s criminal history could be checked during a stop for a 
traffic violation, but that a criminal investigation beyond the scope of citing 
an individual for a traffic violation was impermissible absent Rule 3.1 rea-
sonable suspicion.154 The court restates this rule in Pickle by analogizing the 
unlawful search into Pickle’s criminal history to the suspicionless detention 
of a motorist after the legitimate purpose of a traffic stop has been complet-
ed.155 In drawing this analogy, the court cited to Lilley v. State.156 
In Lilley, an officer pulled over a driver after watching his car “drive 
off the road three times.”157 The officer obtained the driver’s license and 
vehicle paperwork and asked the driver, Lilley, to follow him to his patrol 
car.158 While Lilley sat in the patrol car, the officer ran a criminal history 
check, spoke with Lilley, issued a warning to Lilley, and returned his vehi-
cle paperwork.159 The court held that “the traffic stop [was] completed after 
 
 151.  It should be noted that hunting without a license on your person is itself a misde-
meanor. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-107(a)(3) (Repl. 2013); ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH 
COMMISSION CODE BOOK, § 03.01 (2015). Because Pickle was guilty of a misdemeanor just 
by hunting without possessing a hunting license on his person, it was extremely odd for the 
court to hold that “the facts presented in this case did not give rise to reasonable suspicion 
allowing officers to conduct a criminal investigation.” Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 7, 466 
S.W.3d at 414. 
 152.  See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 153.  See Pickle, 2015 Ark. 286, at 6–7, 466 S.W.3d at 413–14. 
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the warning and vehicle documentation were handed to Lilley.”160 At that 
point, when the traffic stop was completed, the Rule 3.1 reasonable suspi-
cion criteria applied to any further detention of Lilley by the officer.161 
There are many similarities between Pickle and Lilley. While the court 
did not decide whether the search that revealed Pickle’s identity was lawful, 
for the purposes of the court’s reasoning Pickle and Lilley both involved 
lawful stops by a law enforcement officer.162 Both stops were considered 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.163 Also, both stops were premised on 
the purpose of ensuring compliance with standards that are in place to pre-
serve safe and responsible use of a highly regulated activity.164 Both stops 
were of a nature that disallowed detention of an individual for purposes that 
exceeded the scope of the initial stop, unless during the stop a reasonable 
suspicion that would support Rule 3.1 developed.165 However, the similarity 
ends here. In Lilley, it was after the completion of a criminal history check 
that the Rule 3.1 criteria applied to the detention, but in Pickle the Rule 3.1 
criteria applied to the detention prior to the criminal history check.166 
There is clear precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States 
that in the context of traffic stops, warrant checks are not a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.167 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has 
said that a criminal history check during a valid traffic stop is “not only rou-
tine but prudent.”168 
Analogizing Pickle to a traffic stop is confusing because running a war-
rant check during a traffic stop is a firmly established official procedure that 
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has been held not to intrude upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.169 But in Pickle, it is the running of a warrant check that was held to 
be a search that extends beyond the scope of any lawful administrative 
search that was performed in accord with the Fourth Amendment.170 
The court’s holding in Pickle provides defense attorneys with a good 
argument that a check for outstanding warrants goes beyond the scope of a 
routine traffic stop because the stop should involve no more than an of-
ficer’s determination that a driver’s license and registration are valid and the 
issuance of a citation. After these procedures, the legitimate purpose of a 
traffic stop would have ended.171 This argument is given greater weight be-
cause this is the very scenario that the court used to illustrate its reasoning 
when it drew an analogy between Pickle and Lilley.172 
b. Pickle will be cited in many motions to suppress evidence 
Rule 3.1 says that a law enforcement officer who possesses reasonable 
suspicion may lawfully stop and detain any person he suspects “if such ac-
tion is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of 
the person or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct.”173 It should be 
noted that Rule 3.1 is vague enough that any person who is searched due to 
an outstanding warrant during an investigative stop, and subsequently ar-
rested and charged for crimes stemming from that search, has a plausible 
argument that it is not within the scope of verifying one’s identity or deter-
mining the lawfulness of one’s conduct to run a criminal history check to 
search for outstanding warrants.174 
This argument is now bolstered by the Pickle holding.175 It is very 
probable that Pickle will be cited in numerous motions to suppress. Defense 
attorneys will attempt to argue that even if the detention of a charged indi-
vidual was premised on reasonable suspicion, the Pickle precedent prevents 
that detention from extending to a criminal history check for outstanding 
warrants. Extending the scope of a Rule 3.1 investigation to include a crimi-
nal history check may go “far beyond the scope” of any search conducted 
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2017] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 
for the purpose of verifying an individual’s identity and determining that her 
conduct is lawful.176 
c. A peculiar expectation of privacy 
The Pickle search creates an expectation of privacy in an individual’s 
criminal history that cannot be intruded on by law enforcement officers dur-
ing a lawful detention for the purposes of an administrative search.177 This 
newfound expectation of privacy in one’s criminal record is a novelty in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. And while “there is no constitutional 
objection to a rule of law that provides more protection to individual liberty 
than the minimum required by the Constitution of the United States,”178 it 
appears odd to say that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the public record.179 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has 
created a new type of administrative search that provides this peculiar pro-
tection to individual liberty.180 
C. The Purpose for Creating the Pickle Search 
Detaining, searching, and arresting a hunter after stalking him for two 
hours without observing any indication of unlawful conduct is a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement for searches and sei-
zures.181 The Supreme Court of Arkansas must have thought so or it would 
not have been so eager to suppress the evidence against Pickle. 
It is likely that the Supreme Court of Arkansas created the Pickle 
search in an attempt to preserve the authority of AGFC officers to arbitrarily 
target sportsmen for the purpose of checking regulatory compliance, without 
having to say that in this instance the Fourth Amendment was violated. 
However, when the court assumed without deciding that the officers’ search 
of Pickle was appropriate, it needlessly sidestepped an issue that is likely to 
reach the court again.182 There is great uncertainty now as to whether AGFC 
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officers may randomly check hunters for compliance with game laws, and if 
not, what measures must be in place to satisfy the requirement that checks 
be made pursuant to a plan of neutral limitations on officer discretion.183 
V. CONCLUSION 
Within the framework of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing 
warrantless searches that do not require a degree of individualized suspicion, 
an AGFC officer’s authority to protect our natural resources can be pre-
served without resorting to the creation of Fourth Amendment novelties. 
Any plan that removes arbitrary discretion from the officer in the field will 
satisfy the required “neutral criteria” that must be in place under Prouse and 
Allen.184 
It is likely, in the case of Pickle, that such a plan was already in place. 
If the officers who arrested Pickle were ordered by the AGFC to patrol a 
certain area and to check consecutively all hunters therein, so long as the 
officers did not possess discretion to transgress those orders, this would 
qualify as a plan embodying neutral criteria. 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas said that the record was not developed 
by which it could determine whether the officers’ detention and search of 
Pickle violated the Fourth Amendment. However, a better result would have 
been reached if the court would have ruled that the officers’ conduct in this 
case violated the Fourth Amendment. Then Pickle’s motion to suppress 
would still have been granted, and the court would not have had to resort to 
creating a new rule of law to reach this result. 
In issuing its opinion, the court could then have outlined the measures 
of neutral criteria that should be followed to prevent a Fourth Amendment 
violation in a similar scenario in the future. By doing so, the court could 
have affirmed and clarified the law without changing the scope of authority 
that is possessed by AGFC officers and bringing into doubt the authority of 
other law enforcement to conduct criminal history checks in other contexts. 
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